Halliburton II: A Loser\u27s History by Pritchard, A.C.
PRITCHARD 08.19.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)  11/6/2015 3:35 PM 
 
 
HALLIBURTON II: A LOSER’S 
HISTORY 
A.C. PRITCHARD* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to bring 
fundamental reform to securities class actions last term in Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. The Court ducked that opportunity, 
passing the buck to Congress to undo the mess that the Court had 
created a quarter century prior in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Congress’s 
history in dealing with securities class actions suggests that reform is 
unlikely to come from the legislature anytime soon. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission appears to be satisfied with the status quo 
as well. With these institutional actors resisting reform, corporations 
and their shareholders may resort to self-help in dealing with the cost 
and distraction created by securities class actions. Paradoxically, 
resistance to reform of securities class actions may result in self-help 
measures that eliminate securities class actions—and their deterrent 
value—altogether. 
I.  INVASIVE SPECIES? A LOSER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Securities fraud class actions can be seen as a judicial invasive 
species: carelessly introduced, hell on the native fauna, and almost 
impossible to eradicate. Judges thoughtlessly unleashed this parasite 
when they took it upon themselves to develop a remedy for fraud 
infecting secondary securities markets (i.e., transactions between 
investors); no statute compelled them to do it. Nothing in the relevant 
statute and its implementing regulation—in this case, § 10(b) of the 
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Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule 10b-52—authorizes a 
private cause of action for securities fraud. Instead, the courts, egged 
on by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), invented it 
out of whole cloth, ignoring more limited private causes of action 
explicitly created by Congress.3 Since the private cause of action 
under Rule 10b-5 was first discovered by the courts,4 the Supreme 
Court has at various times expanded and contracted its scope. In 
general, however, the § 10(b) private right of action has grown from 
what then-Justice William Rehnquist called a “legislative acorn” into a 
“judicial oak.”5 
Kudzu is more like it. This invasive species of securities fraud class 
actions went from nuisance to menace—endangering shareholders of 
public companies and the competitiveness of the U.S. capital 
markets—when the Supreme Court handed down Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.6 In Basic, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs need not 
show individual reliance on alleged corporate misrepresentations but 
instead could rely on the market price having incorporated those 
misstatements: the “fraud-on-the-market” (FOTM) presumption. The 
FOTM presumption allows plaintiffs’ lawyers to certify a class action 
for securities fraud. Class certification is a big deal: defendants 
inevitably face enormous costs from litigating and settling these suits, 
thus creating an enormous incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring 
cases for nuisance value alone. 
After Basic there was a huge spike in securities litigation.7 But 
those lawsuits almost never resolved the question of whether 
corporate fraud had actually occurred. Stock prices dropped, by 
reason of fraud or otherwise, suits were brought, and settlements—
totaling many billions of dollars—were paid. Plaintiffs’ lawyers took 
home billions in fees as their cut for acting as middlemen in effecting 
 
 1.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2015). 
 2.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2015). 
 3.  Most notable here is § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, which creates an explicit 
cause of action for material misstatements in SEC filings. See Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2015). 
 4.  See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (the initial case 
finding a private cause of action). 
 5.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 6.  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 7.  Vincent E. O’Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, 
at A20 (reporting that the rate at which securities class actions were filed nearly tripled from the 
date of the Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision in 1988 to June 1991). 
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these transfers; companies paid their own lawyers similar sums for 
defending them. By the mid-1990s, the parasites of the securities bar 
were thriving, stunting the growth of American companies. Along with 
their rise came calls for reform from corporate America. 
Congress responded to the flood of cases unleashed by Basic by 
tweaking the rules of securities class action in 1995, but it left the 
fundamental framework intact.8 The politics of the situation—
plaintiffs’ lawyers on one side, similarly deep-pocketed corporate 
defendants on the other—resulted in a wary stalemate. The political 
gridlock could readily be interpreted as legislative acquiescence. The 
Supreme Court tried to trim the oak it created in a series of 
controversial decisions. But neither Congress nor the Court was 
willing to eradicate the invasive species and replant. The number of 
cases being filed did not change, and securities class actions became a 
fixture in the public corporation landscape. 
The Supreme Court’s recalcitrance might be excused by the fact 
that it was never squarely faced with the issue of whether to overrule 
Basic. That opportunity arose in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc.9—commonly known as Halliburton II. Halliburton II finally 
presented the question of whether the Court should repudiate 
FOTM—a potentially pivotal moment in the history of securities 
fraud class actions. Overruling Basic’s FOTM presumption would 
have presented an opportunity to rebuild securities fraud class actions 
from the ground up on a more coherent foundation based upon an 
understanding of modern securities markets. Instead of pursuing 
fundamental reform, the Court tinkered around the periphery, adding 
a new battle of the experts to these cases, taking them further away 
from actually adjudicating the question of fraud. The Court’s 
Halliburton II decision arguably makes a bad situation worse, as I 
explain below. At the very least, it will make these suits more 
expensive for shareholders without any discernible benefit in terms of 
deterring corporate fraud. In other words, more costs with no benefits. 
How did we get here? 
 
 
 8.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified in part at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (West 2015)). The most important change was 
the PSLRA’s pleading standard, which requires that the fraud be pleaded with particularity, 
including pleading facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant made the 
misstatement with a fraudulent state of mind.  See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 
U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard). 
 9.  134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014). 
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The outcome in Halliburton II is personally disappointing; 
incremental reform seemed within grasp. I have been advocating 
generally for reform of securities class actions since beginning my 
academic career more than fifteen years ago, and I advocated for a 
particular reform in Halliburton II.10 That plea was rebuffed by the 
Supreme Court. That response was disappointing to me as a reformer 
interested in promoting deterrence and efficiency. But it is puzzling to 
me as a scholar who focuses on the history of securities law in the 
Supreme Court. No one thinks that the justices are stupid, but more 
than a quarter century of tinkering with securities fraud class actions 
by the Court has produced a regime that is impossible to defend. 
Presented with an opportunity to fix securities class actions, the 
Court’s response is judicial abdication: it’s not our problem, man. 
Given that the principal impetus fueling securities fraud class actions 
came from the Supreme Court, why won’t the Court take 
responsibility for eradicating this noxious weed? Serious question: 
Why won’t the justices step up and fix this mess? 
In this essay, I attempt to answer that question. History is written 
by the victors, the saying goes.11 But maybe the losers can offer a 
useful—if inevitably critical—perspective, too. The future, after all, is 
not yet written. A better historical understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s development of securities class actions might offer some 
guidance for that future. In Halliburton II, the Court missed an 
opportunity to reduce wasteful litigation and redirect legal resources 
toward deterring actual corporate fraud. The Court ducked. Why are 
we left with judicial inaction while the invasive species of securities 
fraud class actions continues to spread? 
I believe the answer is rooted in the Court’s incremental approach 
to securities fraud class actions, uninformed by empirical data on how 
these lawsuits work in the real world. Meaningful reform of securities 
fraud class actions must begin with reining in the grossly inflated 
measure of damages that the lower courts have assumed to be 
applicable in such cases. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never 
shown any interest in that reform. Moreover, reforming the damages 
 
 10.  Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (hereinafter Brief 
of Law Professors). 
 11.  George Orwell, As I Please, TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1944 (“A Nazi and a non-Nazi version of 
the present war would have no resemblance to one another, and which of them finally gets into 
the history books will be decided not by evidential methods but on the battlefield. . . . History is 
written by the winners.”). 
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measure would require bold initiative, something that has been 
largely lacking from the Court’s securities jurisprudence since it 
handed down Basic. Indeed, its incremental approach to securities 
class actions has created a regime that may allow the fundamental 
question of damages to be kicked down the road indefinitely. The 
Court’s inertia is reinforced by the SEC, which stands in the way of 
damages reform for securities fraud class actions. The Court has 
repeatedly invited Congress to weigh in on securities class action 
reform, but the legislature sits on the sidelines, paralyzed by classic 
political gridlock. Given this sorry history, the future may see 
corporations and their shareholders resorting to self-help by 
eliminating the option of securities fraud class actions altogether. That 
alternative would eliminate not only the wasteful wealth transfers of 
securities fraud class actions, but also their deterrent value. 
II.  RELIANCE AND SECONDARY MARKET SECURITIES FRAUD 
CLASS ACTIONS 
Congress did not create a general private cause of action for fraud 
when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. Instead, it opted 
to create narrow causes of action for specific types of misconduct, 
such as market manipulation.12 Congress did, however, authorize the 
SEC to adopt antifraud rules that the agency could then enforce. The 
SEC exercised that rulemaking authority in 1940 when it adopted 
Rule 10b-5.13 Rule 10b-5, like § 10(b), the statutory provision that 
authorizes it, says nothing about a private cause of action. The courts, 
however, have not been deterred by that void and have implied a 
sweeping cause of action under Rule 10b-5. In the absence of a 
statutory directive, courts have relied heavily on the requirements of 
the common law action for deceit (the typical cause of action for 
fraud) in fleshing out the details of that implied Rule 10b-5 cause of 
action.14 At common law, plaintiffs were required to allege that they 
had relied on a fraudulent misstatement and that it induced them to 
make the purchase. So for a fraud claim involving a company’s 
common stock, an investor-plaintiff would have to show that they 
read the misstatements that allegedly distorted the price of a 
 
 12.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78i (West 2015). 
 13.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2015). 
 14.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 341, 361 (2005) (stating that a private right of 
action under § 10(b) “resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and 
misrepresentation”). 
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company’s stock before they purchased (or sold). The problem, 
however, is that for companies whose shares are publicly traded, 
many (perhaps most) of the investors buying and selling the 
company’s shares will not have read the misstatement, or even been 
aware of it. Consequently, they will not be able to claim reliance in the 
traditional sense. Thus, the reliance requirement posed a substantial 
obstacle to bringing a case involving secondary market fraud under 
Rule 10b-5. 
The problem is particularly acute for class actions. If all plaintiffs 
were required to allege, individually, that they had read and relied 
upon the misstatement in making their decision to purchase or sell, a 
class could not be certified because it would have too many factual 
questions that were not common to the class (a prerequisite to class 
certification).15 Moreover, individual investors would rarely have 
sufficient losses to justify the expense of bringing suit on their own, 
even if they could satisfy the reliance requirement. 
To overcome this obstacle to class certification, the Supreme 
Court effectively gutted the reliance requirement for most claims of 
secondary market fraud, albeit in a surreptitious way. The gutting took 
two steps, both choreographed by Justice Harry Blackmun. Justice 
Blackmun first excused the reliance requirement for fraudulent 
omissions with his opinion for the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
Utah v. United States.16 The gravamen of the fraud in Affiliated Ute was 
deceptive non-disclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty. This first step 
in Affiliated Ute was understandable and perhaps inevitable. In the 
case of non-disclosure, it was impossible for the plaintiffs to plead 
actual reliance because the violation was a failure to speak, rather 
than a misstatement. In such a situation, the Court concluded that 
materiality of the omission would “establish the requisite element of 
causation in fact.” The holding was unsurprising in that context—how 
can you rely on something left unsaid?—but Justice Blackmun’s 
approach would lead to mischief going forward. In Affiliated Ute, the 
Court treated reliance simply as a species of the tort concept of 
proximate causation: Is the defendant’s conduct sufficiently close to  
 
 15.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (A class action is maintainable if “the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting individual class members.”). 
 16.  406 U.S. 128 (1972) (excusing reliance in case involving fraudulent non-disclosure by a 
fiduciary). 
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the harm to the plaintiff? Framed this way, the question seems 
deceptively easy, Torts 101 as it were. 
The complexity of the reliance issue became more apparent, 
however, when the Court returned to the issue fifteen years later. The 
logic of Affiliated Ute’s presumption of reliance did not cover 
affirmative misstatements, so the obstacle that reliance creates for 
class certification remained in those cases. The Court in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, urged on by the SEC, and with Justice Blackmun again 
writing for the majority, effectively completed the dismantling of the 
reliance requirement by adopting the “fraud-on-the-market” 
presumption of reliance. The FOTM presumption allows plaintiffs to 
skip the step of alleging personal reliance on the misstatement, 
instead allowing them to allege that the market relied on the 
misrepresentation in valuing the security, and that, in turn, they relied 
on a market price that was distorted by the deception. The economic 
premise underlying the FOTM presumption is the efficient capital 
market hypothesis, which holds that markets rapidly incorporate 
information—true or false—into the market price of a security. Thus, 
the price paid by the plaintiffs would have been inflated by the fraud, 
establishing a causal connection between the fraud and the purchase. 
For Justice Blackmun, the economic analysis was painfully obvious: 
“Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”17 
Justice Byron White, dissenting in Basic, worried the economics 
were more complicated: “[T]he Court, I fear, embarks on a course 
that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences it 
cannot foresee.”18 Presciently, Justice White noted that adopting the 
appropriate measure of damages was critical to the implementation of 
the Court’s new FOTM regime. Justice White also noted, however, 
that Justice Blackmun and the Court’s majority had ducked that 
question.19 What neither Justice White nor Justice Blackmun could 
have anticipated, however, is that the Court would fail to address the 
critical question of damages for the twenty-five plus years after 
handing down Basic. The economic waste that followed the adoption 
of the FOTM presumption could have been mitigated if the Court 
had adopted a measure of damages appropriate to the FOTM 
 
 17.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. 
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 18.  Id. at 254 (White, J., dissenting). 
 19.  Id. at 254 n.5. 
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reliance regime. We are still waiting for the Supreme Court to address 
this question. 
III.  DAMAGES 
Why did the Court pass on the critical question of damages? The 
easy answer is that it was not presented in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
which was before the Court on a motion to dismiss (damages issues 
would typically not be reached by an appellate court until after a jury 
verdict). At least one justice (John Paul Stevens), however, recognized 
that the damages question was a challenging one; Justice Stevens 
asked Justice Blackmun to note in the Court’s opinion that the Court 
was not resolving it.20 This is perhaps fortunate, as Justice Blackmun 
might well have made things worse. The available evidence suggests 
he was focused solely on compensation; there is no evidence that he 
even considered disgorgement, the typical remedy provided for in the 
explicit causes of action in the federal securities laws.21 
The elements of reliance and damages are not so easily severed. In 
adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption, Justice Blackmun saw 
himself as merely following his earlier opinion in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States;22 which Justice Blackmun 
characterized as holding that reliance was satisfied as long as “the 
necessary nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct had been established.”23 In Affiliated Ute, the 
connection between reliance and damages was self-evident. The 
fraudulent transaction at issue fit neatly into the tort action for deceit. 
The plaintiffs’ losses corresponded to the defendants’ gains; the 
defendants had withheld material information about the value of the 
securities that they were purchasing from the plaintiffs. The ordinary 
“out-of-pocket” measure of tort damages—the difference between 
the price paid to (or by) the victim and the security’s “true” value—
 
 20.  Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes, Basic v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (Nov. 4, 1987) 
(Harry A. Blackmun Collection, Library of Congress).  
 21.  Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William J. Brennan, Jr., No. 86-279, Basic v. 
Levinson (Jan. 15, 1988) (Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress) (“[T]here are at 
least two theories of damages that a plaintiff could propose, and this opinion does not lend 
particular support to either. . . . [T]he plaintiff could argue that he would not have sold had he 
known about the merger discussion, and thus that he should receive the difference between the 
price at which he sold ($18) and the eventual merger price ($42). Alternatively, one could argue 
that a plaintiff should recover the difference between the price he sold ($18) and what the price 
would have been had defendants not misrepresented the facts ($20).”). 
 22.  406 U.S. 128, 156 (1972). 
 23.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. 
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fits in this context. In this scenario, requiring that the defendant 
compensate the plaintiff for her losses corrects the distortions caused 
by fraud in two ways. First, requiring compensation to the victim 
discourages the defendant from committing fraud: no upside. Second, 
compensation discourages investors from spending resources trying to 
avoid the consequences of fraud. 
Expenditures on committing and avoiding fraud are the real social 
costs that the anti-fraud cause of action is trying to prevent. The 
wealth transfer from the victim to the defendant is relevant only 
insofar as it induces those expenditures. That policy goal is clear; more 
subtle is the connection between those costs and the reliance element 
of the tort action for deceit.24 Expenditures by both the perpetrator 
and the victim due to fraud are a social waste, so discouraging those 
expenditures by requiring compensation makes sense when the 
defendant is benefiting from the fraud. Fraud may influence how 
investors direct their capital. Firms selling securities in the primary 
market disclose more information in an effort to attract investors. If 
those disclosures are fraudulent, investors will pay an inflated price 
for those securities and companies will invest in projects that are not 
cost-justified. That risk of fraud will lead investors to discount the 
value of securities generally, thus raising the cost of capital for 
publicly traded firms. The upshot is that fraud should be punished 
when the defendant benefits from the securities transaction affected 
by fraud. Requiring a defendant to compensate a victim ensures that 
fraud does not pay. Compensation and deterrence are neatly aligned. 
Basic’s FOTM presumption, however, does not require that the 
defendant have purchased or sold the security whose price was 
allegedly affected by the misstatement. In fact, in the overwhelming 
majority of securities fraud class actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys sue the 
corporation and its officers for misrepresenting the company’s 
operations, financial performance, or future prospects that inflate the 
price of the company’s stock in secondary trading markets. Because 
the corporation has not sold securities in that market (and thereby 
transferred wealth to itself), it has no institutional incentive to spend 
real resources in executing the fraud—and thus no reason to 
 
 24.  Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 
VA. L. REV. 623, 630 (1992) (“If fraud is not deterred, market participants will take expensive 
precautions to uncover fraud so as to avoid entering into bargains they would not have 
concluded in an honest market.”). 
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encourage the investor reliance that the FOTM presumption seeks to 
promote. 
On the investor side of the equation, secondary market fraud does 
not create a net wealth transfer away from investors, at least in the 
aggregate. For every shareholder who bought at a fraudulently 
inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The buyer’s individual 
loss is offset by the seller’s gain.25 Assuming all traders are ignorant of 
the fraud, they can expect to win as often as they lose from 
fraudulently distorted prices.26 With no expected loss from fraud on 
the market, shareholders have little incentive to take precautions 
against the fraud. Thus, secondary-market fraud fits awkwardly in the 
confines of the tort action for deceit, which so neatly fits 
misrepresentations in face-to-face transactions. In face-to-face 
transactions, parties naturally take precautions to manage the risk of 
fraud (verification), so deterring fraud in those transactions deters 
expenditures on precautions, the real social cost engendered by fraud. 
Oddly enough, the status of many shareholders as passive price 
takers in the secondary market was one of the rationales offered by 
the Basic Court for adopting the FOTM presumption. The Basic 
Court has it exactly backwards: Because these shareholders are 
passive, they are not relying in the economically relevant sense, which 
is to say, they are not making a choice to forego verification and 
instead rely on statements. Verification is not an option for the passive 
investor (the intended beneficiary of the FOTM presumption); 
checking the accuracy of a corporation’s statements is a task that can 
be only undertaken by an investment professional, and even these 
sophisticated actors will uncover fraud only rarely (and profit 
handsomely when they do, suggesting that it may not be essential to 
compensate them when they do not). Passive investors can protect 
themselves against fraud much more cheaply through diversification. 
Fraud, like other business reversals, is a firm-specific risk, so 
assembling a broad portfolio of companies essentially eliminates its 
effect on an investor’s portfolio. The losses from the few bad apples 
will be offset by the (discounted) gains from the honest companies. 
 
 25.  Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 607, 611 (1985). 
 26.  Alicia Davis Evans, Are Investors’ Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal Over 
Time? Some Preliminary Evidence (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, 
Paper No. 13, Oct. 25, 2010) (demonstrating that diversified traders’ gains and losses from 
securities fraud average out to essentially zero). 
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The irony of the FOTM presumption, intended to protect passive 
investors, is that the ultimate passive investors—holders of index 
funds—have already protected themselves against fraud in the 
secondary market, and at a very low cost. 
Notwithstanding the ability of shareholders to protect themselves 
through diversification, the FOTM presumption, when coupled with 
the “out-of-pocket” tort measure of damages, puts the corporation on 
the hook to compensate investors who come out on the losing end of 
a trade at a price distorted by misrepresentation.27 The current rule 
holds corporations responsible for the entire loss of all of the 
shareholders who paid too much for their shares as a result of 
fraudulent misrepresentations attributed to the corporation. Critically, 
the “out-of-pocket” measure of damages provides no offset for the 
windfall gain on the other side of the trade. The investors lucky 
enough to have been selling during the period of the fraud do not 
have to give their profits back (they did not commit fraud). Given the 
trading volume in secondary markets, the potential recoverable 
damages in securities class actions can be a substantial percentage of 
the corporation’s total capitalization, easily reaching hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and sometimes billions, for companies whose stock 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq. With 
potential damages in this range, class actions are a big stick to wield 
against fraud. More importantly, the “out-of-pocket” measure 
exaggerates the social harm caused by FOTM because it fails to 
account for the windfall gains of equally innocent shareholders who 
sold at the inflated price. Absent insider trading (for which there are 
other remedies), the losses and gains will be a wash for shareholders 
in the aggregate, even though some individual shareholders will have 
suffered substantial losses. 
That seems wasteful, but the waste becomes more salient in light 
of the fact that no real compensatory purpose is served by securities 
fraud class actions. Despite the enormous sums being spent on 
litigation, shareholders typically get pennies on the dollar for their 
losses. Worse yet, the settlements are paid from either corporate 
coffers or directors’ and officers’ insurance (for which the premia 
were paid by the corporation). The net result is that settlements are 
being paid at the expense of former and current shareholders. 
 
 27.  See Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under 
Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177 (1996) (discussing damages under Rule 10b-5). 
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Shareholders as a class are undeniably net losers from this circular 
exercise, as lawyers (and experts) take home the real money in 
exchange for their efforts in keeping the securities fraud class action 
industrial complex running. 
Are these gigantic expenditures on lawyers deterring corporate 
fraud? We don’t really know. Sorting cases of actual fraud from mere 
business reverses is a difficult task—fact intensive and requiring 
subtle judgments. It should be no surprise that a system charged with 
that task is expensive. If securities class actions succeed in accurately 
sorting fraud from non-fraud, it might well justify the enormous sums 
spent on lawyers. But if lawyers are paid billions without reducing the 
probability or magnitude of corporate fraud, then from a social 
welfare perspective these payments to lawyers are a deadweight loss. 
Making sensible policy choices about securities fraud class actions 
necessitates grappling with that question. But there is no evidence 
that judges—and in particular the justices who sit on the Supreme 
Court—are up to that task, notwithstanding their willingness to 
conduct a high stakes policy experiment with securities fraud class 
actions. 
IV.  THE DELUGE AND THE RESPONSE 
The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was intended to 
facilitate securities fraud class actions. Measured by this criterion, 
Basic was a tremendous success. The number of securities fraud class 
actions increased dramatically after Basic Inc. v. Levinson validated 
the FOTM presumption. 
Although the FOTM presumption ensures that private plaintiffs 
would have incentives to sue, the out-of-pocket measure of damages 
assumed by lower courts means that the incentives to sue were 
excessive. The FOTM presumption generates too many suits because 
defendants’ incentive to settle these cases has only a tenuous 
connection with the merits: even a small prospect of losing at trial 
puts a big thumb on the scale toward settlement, even if the company 
has done nothing wrong. The math is simple: a one percent chance of 
losing a $2 billion judgment makes it economically rational to cut a 
check for $20 million, even ignoring the massive costs of mounting a 
defense.28 Even supremely confident defendants will settle meritless 
 
 28.  See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1511 (1996) (“The class-based compensatory damages regime in theory 
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cases rather than risk the very real possibility of a jury verdict that 
threatens bankruptcy. Such settlements are wasteful; investors do not 
benefit when companies pay settlements that have little to do with the 
merits of the case. Unless settlements are targeting fraud with a high 
degree of accuracy, securities class actions are little more than a costly 
form of insurance against business reverses. Investors ultimately foot 
the bill while lawyers profit. 
Even in cases of actual fraud, the FOTM regime raises a lot of 
questions. To start, consider that any lies were told not by “the 
company”—an artificial legal construct—but by executives who spoke 
on its behalf.29 These officers may have benefitted from these lies 
(along with any shareholders who sold shares after the lie but before 
the fraud was revealed), but these officers do not pay damages to 
compensate those who bought after the lies and held their shares. The 
company pays those losing investors, which effectively means current 
shareholders (who did not profit from the lies) pay for them.30 This 
transfer of wealth, from innocent current shareholders to former 
shareholders—with a big chunk going to lawyers—serves no obvious 
retributive purpose. And with wrongdoing managers typically not 
paying any portion of the damages, the case for deterrence is shaky at 
best. 
What are the consequences of the Supreme Court’s policy 
experiment? The incentives unleashed by Basic spawned a flood of 
securities fraud suits, often targeting start-up firms with high volatility, 
regardless of connection to actual fraud. When the stock prices of 
these firms fell, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed suits, and then combed 
disclosures for potential misstatements. Settlements followed quickly, 
however, obviating any need to prove fraud. The upshot was a tax on 
risk, which raised the cost of capital for start-up firms. 
In response, Republicans made securities class action reform a 
centerpiece of their Contract with America in 1994. When the 
Republicans took control of Congress that year, they passed the 
 
imposes remedies that are so catastrophically large that defendants are unwilling to go to trial 
even if they believe the chance of being found liable is small.”). 
 29.  Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691.  
 30.  See id. at 719 (“Although compensating victims may be a laudable goal, enterprise 
liability does not serve the goal of just compensation because it simply replaces one group of 
innocent victims with another: those who were shareholders when the fraud was revealed. 
Moreover, enterprise liability does not even effect a one-to-one transfer between innocent 
victims: a large percentage of the plaintiffs’ recovery goes to their lawyers.”). 
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), with the 
substantial Democratic support necessary to override President 
William Clinton’s veto of the bill.31 The PSLRA made a number of 
reforms intended to reduce the extortionate threat of securities class 
actions. Most notably, it raised the standards for pleading fraud, 
delayed discovery until after a hearing on a motion to dismiss, and 
changed the selection of lead counsel from a race to the courthouse to 
a presumption in favor of the attorney chosen by the shareholder-
plaintiff with the largest economic stake in the outcome.32 The effect 
of these restrictions has been to force plaintiffs to focus on objective 
evidence, such as restatements, insider trading, and SEC enforcement 
actions, as the basis for bringing suit.33 This means that securities class 
actions are now brought when the indicia of fraud are relatively 
obvious, so they serve no purpose in uncovering fraud. And not 
surprisingly, cases continue to be brought when the damages 
calculation is greatest, with large stock price drops and heavy 
trading.34 This means that post-PSLRA, the companies punished 
hardest by the market are also the ones that are most likely to face a 
class action. If securities class actions are a “necessary supplement” to 
SEC enforcement,35 Congress’s reforms in the PSLRA have ensured 
that the supplement is directed where it is least needed. 
This failure is the result of Congress not dealing with the 
underlying drivers of these suits: the FOTM presumption and the 
incoherent measure of damages. The House of Representatives 
considered eliminating the FOTM presumption,36 but the SEC 
opposed the provision37 and it was abandoned in favor of a 
codification of FOTM which would have set forth more clearly when 
 
 31.  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in part at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 
(West 2015)). 
 32.  For a discussion of these provisions, see Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson, & A.C. 
Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007). 
 33.  Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson, & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 35 (2009). 
 34.  Johnson et al., supra note 31, at 641, Table 4. 
 35.  Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985). 
 36.  H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995). A comprehensive account of the legislative history of the 
PSLRA can be found in John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding 
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996). 
 37.  Testimony of Chairman Arthur Levitt Concerning Litigation Reform Proposals Before 
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Commerce, Feb. 
10, 1995, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt. 
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the presumption would apply.38 By the time the bill came out of 
conference, this codification of the FOTM presumption also had been 
abandoned.39 The result was stalemate on the FOTM presumption. 
Why did Congress back away from undoing Basic’s FOTM 
presumption? One answer is that the original House bill offered 
nothing in its place. Requiring plaintiffs to plead actual reliance 
eliminates class actions for frauds affecting secondary markets, 
leaving fraud deterrence exclusively in the hands of the SEC and the 
Justice Department. Another reason may be that eliminating 
compensation is a political non-starter. The “pocket shifting” element 
of secondary-market class actions has been well known for a long 
time, but it does not seem to have influenced legislative thinking. 
Congress’s contribution on the subject of compensation came in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which includes a “Fair Funds” provision 
allowing the SEC to use recoveries from its enforcement actions to 
compensate investors.40 This provision of compensation is perverse 
from a policy perspective, as compensating defrauded investors takes 
some of the sting out of putting all of their eggs in one basket—not 
exactly a shrewd investment strategy. As noted above, widows and 
orphans can better protect themselves against the risk of fraud 
through portfolio diversification (and at far less cost). The Fair Funds 
provision is evidence that providing compensation to widows and 
orphans sells well on the campaign trail, even if the expenditures on 
compensation are largely a social waste. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court heard several big cases with 
Basic’s FOTM presumption lurking in the background. Its restrictive 
decisions suggest that the Court viewed the system—one that it had 
created—as fundamentally broken. In Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver the Court held that there was no aiding and 
abetting liability for private securities fraud suits.41 The Court 
extended this ruling to cover alleged schemes to defraud in Stoneridge 
Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta42 and in Janus Capital Group, 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,43 which limits liability to the legal entity 
that actually makes a misstatement. In another series of cases, the 
 
 38.  H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 1, at 2 (1995). 
 39.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
 40.  15 U.S.C.A. § 7246(a) (West 2015).  
 41.  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 42.  552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 43.  131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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Court narrowly interpreted the concept of causation. In Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,44 the Court held that it was not 
enough for plaintiffs to show they bought shares at prices inflated by 
lies; they also had to show that the revelation of the lies caused the 
stock price to drop. The cases, which repeatedly erected incremental 
barriers to plaintiffs bringing securities class actions, make sense only 
if the justices perceive securities fraud class actions as a highly 
dysfunctional system for deterring corporate fraud. That dysfunction 
is apparent to even casual observers, but incremental reform is not 
going to fix it. The grossly distorted measure of damages lurks in the 
background. 
Moreover, the Court’s cases did not go all in one direction. 
Although one could reasonably view this series of cases as the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to tame the beast it unleashed upon the 
corporate world, in more recent cases the Court balked at killing the 
beast altogether, or even substantially weakening it. In Tellabs Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights45 the Court interpreted the PSLRA’s pleading 
standard to require that plaintiffs show that the inference of a 
fraudulent intent was as strong as any innocent explanation, the least 
stringent interpretation the language of the statute could plausibly 
support. In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton (Halliburton I)46 the 
Court refused to extend the Dura rule to the class certification 
stage—it held that plaintiffs do not have to show loss causation at the 
class certification stage to invoke the FOTM presumption. Similarly, 
in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds47 the 
Court held that plaintiffs are not required to prove alleged 
misstatements were material (that is, something a reasonable investor 
would care about when making an investment decision) at the class 
action certification stage. Instead, the plaintiff would only be required 
to prove materiality at trial. The Court refused to fashion special rules 
for certifying securities class actions, notwithstanding its apparently 
skeptical view of the merits of many of these claims. Or perhaps the 
Court saw the PSLRA’s pleading standard as reducing the incidence 
of frivolous suits to an acceptable level. 
This pattern of cases seems to mirror the stalemate in Congress; 
tinkering around the edges with incremental reform, but no real 
 
 44.  544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 45.  551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 46.  131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 47.  133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
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appetite for tackling the fundamental flaw. Against this background, it 
came as a surprise in Amgen when four justices—Scalia, Thomas, 
Kennedy, and Alito—urged the Court to reconsider Basic altogether.48 
Their signal suggested a heretofore unrevealed willingness to consider 
reform of the Court’s FOTM policy experiment. The opportunity 
presented itself when the Court’s remand in Halliburton I came back 
for consideration in Halliburton II. 
V.  HALLIBURTON II 
The defendants in Halliburton II argued that Basic Inc. v. Levison 
should be overruled and that plaintiffs should have to show they 
relied on alleged misstatements.49 Given the constraints of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such a decision would have 
made securities fraud class actions effectively impossible, undoing the 
deluge unleashed by Basic. Moreover, private enforcement under § 
10(b) would have been substantially reduced, likely left to 
institutional investors to bring some form of “mass action,” 
constrained by the need for each investor to prove reliance. 
Corporate fraud would not have been left entirely unchecked, since 
there would still be the threat of government enforcement, state law 
claims, and a variety of other potential federal law claims for private 
plaintiffs to pursue. But it would certainly have been a bold judicial 
stroke, and one that might have finally provoked Congress to act. 
Halliburton’s argument for overruling Basic was premised on 
empirical research raising doubts about the efficient capital market 
hypothesis, which was the basis of the Basic Court’s conclusion that 
plaintiffs can rely on the market to quickly incorporate all 
information (true or false) into stock prices. Tackling that question 
would require the justices to digest a good deal of sophisticated 
financial economics. The Court’s track record hardly suggests that the 
justices are ready for that learning experience. Chief Justice Roberts 
fretted at the Halliburton II oral argument that the justices were not 
well positioned to evaluate the financial economics: “How am I 
supposed to review the economic literature and decide which [side in 
this case] is correct . . . ?”50 Chief Justice Roberts’s question implicitly 
suggested that overturning Basic would be an uphill battle, not on the 
 
 48.  Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, 
J., concurring); Amgen, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Brief of Petitioners, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317). 
 50.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).  
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merits, but instead, simply because of judicial incapacity to assess the 
relative strength of the arguments presented. 
A glimmer of hope arose at the oral argument, however, when 
Justice Kennedy asked Halliburton’s lawyer to “address the position 
taken by the law professors, I call it the midway position, that says 
there should be an event study.”51 The “law professors” were myself 
and Todd Henderson of the University of Chicago. We filed an amicus 
brief in which we argued that instead of scrapping Basic’s FOTM 
presumption altogether, the Court should instead require plaintiffs to 
show “price impact” in order to certify a class.52 Price impact means 
the alleged misrepresentations caused the stock price to rise or stay 
steady when it otherwise would have fallen. Our proposal would have 
reformed, rather than scrapped, FOTM class actions. This argument 
went to the second question presented in Halliburton II: “Whether, in 
a case where the plaintiff invokes a presumption of reliance to seek 
class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and 
prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the 
misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.” 
Our proposal introduced a twist on that question by urging that 
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at the class certification stage to 
show price impact. The policy goal underlying our proposal was to 
eliminate debates about the efficiency of markets, which are 
irrelevant to the question of whether fraud occurred. Requiring 
plaintiffs (or, rather, the plaintiffs’ lawyers) to show price impact 
would discourage them from bringing weak cases for their settlement 
value. We argued that disputes over market efficiency were dragging 
district courts into costly and uncertain territory which those judges 
were ill-equipped to manage. The strongest argument, however, is that 
the market efficiency requirement biases suits towards firms trading 
in obviously efficient markets (like the NYSE) instead of arguably 
less efficient ones (like the OTC Pink Sheets). This is perverse 
because the probability of fraud is considerably lower for publicly 
traded firms on the large exchanges relative to more thinly traded 
over-the-counter stocks. Companies whose securities trade in 
“inefficient” markets—e.g., smaller companies trading in the over-the-
counter market and debt issuers—are essentially immune to securities 
class actions, even though these issuers are more likely to commit 
 
 51.  Id. at 17. 
 52.  Brief of Law Professors, supra note 9.  
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fraud because they generally lack the elaborate internal controls and 
Big Four auditors employed by the largest companies. The FOTM 
presumption targets anti-fraud enforcement where it is least needed. 
That is a fairly sophisticated theory, with a lot of moving parts. 
Much of it is probably difficult to grasp for someone not immersed in 
the field of securities fraud class actions. Our strategic assessment, 
however, was that reform of the FOTM presumption was more likely 
than its abandonment, and this reform would be simple enough for 
the justices to grab onto if they were looking for a fix. And a 
compromise solution might have particular appeal for justices who 
are struggling to understand the relevant economic theories. 
As oral argument unfolded, it seemed our strategic calculation 
might pay off. Justice Kennedy raised the possibility of “the law 
professors’ theory of an event study at the certification stage” with 
counsel for the class, who struggled to come up with a rejoinder.53 
Justice Scalia seemed to be jumping on the bandwagon when he 
inquired whether the PSLRA would be compatible with a price 
impact requirement, or as he termed it “Basic writ small.”54 The 
seeming clincher came when Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm 
Stewart, arguing as amicus on behalf of the government and the SEC, 
responded to a question from Justice Elena Kagan. She asked Stewart 
to address the impact “on individual decision-making with respect to 
securities . . . if the law professors’ position was adopted.”55 After some 
meandering, Justice Kennedy nudged Stewart back to Justice Kagan’s 
question.56 Stewart’s response: “I don’t think that the consequences 
would be nearly so dramatic [as overturning Basic]. In fact if anything, 
that would be a net gain to plaintiffs, because plaintiffs already have 
to prove price impact at the end of the day.”57 
Most tealeaf readers (myself included) thought that Stewart’s 
response was the pivotal moment of the oral argument. It appeared 
that the lawyer for the SEC had conceded that requiring a showing of 
price impact would not be a big deal. Indeed, Stewart (erroneously) 
suggested that it might make plaintiffs better off.58 For justices looking 
 
 53.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–34, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-
317). 
 54.  Id. at 40–41. 
 55.  Id. at 47–48. 
 56.  Id. at 49. 
 57.  Id. at 50. 
 58.  Stewart was wrong because his answer ignores the reality that securities class actions 
always settle if they are not dismissed, so the lawsuits never get to “the end of the day.” 
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for an “intermediate position” that would bring reform without 
unduly disrupting existing practice—a conservative ideal straight out 
of Edmund Burke’s playbook—the advocate for the principal 
regulator of the securities markets told them that they had found it. 
Reform, though modest, had won!59 
Not so fast. When the Halliburton II opinion was handed down a 
few months later, the Court rejected our price impact argument, 
instead preserving the requirement that plaintiffs show market 
efficiency to invoke the FOTM presumption. Rather perplexingly, 
however, the Court did allow defendants to prove there was no price 
impact from the alleged misrepresentation. From a policy perspective, 
this move seems like a clear mistake. The Halliburton II decision does 
nothing to discourage plaintiffs’ lawyers from going after the deepest 
pockets—they are still incentivized to target firms that trade in more 
efficient markets. But the decision adds a new battle of the experts—
without jettisoning the old one—that will further increase the already 
enormous cost of litigating these cases. 
Halliburton II’s price impact defense will encourage defendants to 
put on economists to testify that the alleged misstatements did not 
affect the market price. Plaintiffs will respond with their own 
economists who will testify that it did. Trial judges will be charged 
with sorting out the mess. Markets vary in the speed with which they 
incorporate information. Moreover, the significance of the 
information matters as well, so it can be a challenging task to establish 
whether a statement affected the market price. That challenge can be 
particularly daunting if a company releases multiple pieces of 
information at the same time or if corrective disclosure reaches the 
market in dribs and drabs. With the burden of proof on defendants, 
many trial judges, faced with conflicting economic evidence that they 
are scarcely equipped to evaluate, will opt to certify a class. The most 
that defendants can realistically hope to achieve is that the price 
impact inquiry will limit some unduly expansive class periods. 
Consequently, the watered-down role for price impact evidence 
adopted by the Court in Halliburton II is likely to have minimal real-
world effect on the mix of cases pursued by plaintiffs. Despite the 
limited prospects for success and the added litigation expense, it will 
be the rare defendant that does not take advantage of the opportunity 
 
 59.  Adam Liptak, Justices May Limit Securities Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/business/justices-may-limit-securities-fraud-suits.html?_r=0. 
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afforded by the Halliburton II decision. Insurers will raise premia 
paid by companies for directors’ and officers’ insurance to 
compensate for the additional expert fees. Recall that those premia 
are ultimately born by shareholders. 
Why did the Court make a legal move that was such an obvious 
policy mistake? The Court fell back on stare decisis—it was reluctant 
to overturn (or even reform) a decades-old precedent that had 
become such a central feature of modern securities fraud litigation. 
The Court took its timid approach because to do otherwise would 
require it to choose sides in a dispute about financial economics for 
which it was poorly equipped. Chief Justice Roberts is certainly 
correct that issues of financial economics relevant to price impact are 
beyond the ken of most judges. Unfortunately, the Basic FOTM 
presumption, which the Court preserved in Halliburton II, requires 
trial judges to make similarly fraught economic decisions in 
determining market efficiency in every securities fraud class action. 
By choosing to retain the FOTM presumption, the Court did choose a 
side, or rather, chose to stick with the side it had previously chosen in 
Basic. The side it chose pushes in the direction of excessive amounts 
of litigation, targeting the wrong actors, and yielding dubious 
deterrence of fraud. Worse yet, the Court added a price impact 
defense that requires trial judges to tackle a second set of challenging 
economic questions, on top of the existing inquiry into market 
efficiency. Those inquiries have nothing to do with whether or not 
fraud occurred. 
Why throw trial court judges into that briar patch? Counting the 
votes in the majority, Justice Kennedy’s vote with the majority’s timid 
approach is the most puzzling. His questions at oral argument 
suggested that he was open to reforming the FOTM presumption, but 
perhaps he was simply committed to finding a compromise that 
appeared to be “doing something.” Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
makes clear that he was looking for any changes to be at least 
colorably consistent with Basic, so that he could not be accused of 
overruling prior precedent.60 And one can presume that Justice 
Ginsburg and the other concurring justices would have preferred the 
status quo but were willing to cede some ground if it meant 
forestalling dramatic change.61 What we do not know is whether the 
 
 60.  See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415–16 (arguing that a “price impact” defense 
is consistent with Basic). 
 61. Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Court’s judgment . . . should impose no 
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dissenting justices attempted to bargain with Justice Kennedy (as 
Justice Scalia’s comments at oral argument about “Basic writ small” 
suggested they might be willing to do), or whether they were 
committed to overruling Basic altogether. The answer to that question 
will wait for a future history, after the current justices’ internal papers 
are released. 
What we do know from the published opinion in Halliburton II is 
that the Court expects Congress to make substantive reform to 
securities class actions, despite the fact that the Court created the 
current securities class action regime out of whole cloth.62 Of course, 
the Court could have overruled Basic, and given Congress the same 
invitation to create an explicit private right of action in the statute. 
This is effectively what happened in the wake of Central Bank of 
Denver—Congress responded by adding a public right of action for 
aiding and abetting in § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. But 
Congress is unlikely to take the Court up on its invitation to reform 
securities fraud class actions, given that it ducked fundamental reform 
the last time it entered the fray. 
VI.  WHO CAN FIX THIS MESS? 
With its decision in Halliburton II, the Supreme Court has made it 
painfully clear that it is not going to reform securities class actions. 
Although judicial modesty may be a virtue, it is an odd response when 
the Court’s policy experiment made the mess in the first instance. 
Moreover, the Court’s deference to Congress seems misplaced when 
the politicians have demonstrated that they have no appetite for 
reform. And why should they? The legislature didn’t make this mess. 
The Court’s commitment to stare decisis also likely carries little 
weight with the shareholders who (involuntarily) foot the multi-
billion dollar bill for the Court’s ill-considered experiment in fraud 
deterrence policy. Indeed, the Court’s continued tinkering around the 
edges of securities class actions has made a bad situation worse, 
raising the implicit fraud-on-the-market tax on public corporations. 
Halliburton II just raises the levy. 
The fact of the matter is that the Court simply lacks the requisite 
institutional expertise for reform, even if it had the appetite. The 
 
heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”). 
 62. See id. at 2411 (majority opinion) (“As with any other element of that cause of action, 
Congress may overturn or modify any aspect of our interpretations of the reliance requirement, 
including the Basic presumption itself.”). 
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members of the Court are all former government officials, academics, 
appellate advocates, etc. They are all highly talented lawyers, but 
simply put, they are not equipped to confront the highly technical 
field of securities law, which cannot be separated from financial 
economics. It has been almost 30 years since the last justice with 
substantial experience as a corporate lawyer—Lewis F. Powell, Jr.—
retired from the Court.63 (The Basic Inc. v. Levinson fiasco 
immediately followed his departure.) The current Court has made it 
clear that it prefers to leave the field to Congress. Halliburton II 
suggests that the Court’s deference may come, in part, from the 
realization that the justices are not up to the task of reforming 
securities class actions. That task requires both an economist’s 
expertise in financial markets and an institutional understanding of 
how securities class actions work. The intersection of those skill sets is 
a rare enough commodity; expecting it to show up on the Supreme 
Court is wholly unrealistic. 
Perhaps reform could come from Congress? Not likely. As noted 
above, Congress punted on the question of the FOTM presumption 
when it adopted the PSLRA in 1995. Why? The political reality was 
that two powerful constituencies were diametrically opposed. For the 
plaintiffs’ bar, the FOTM presumption was the foundation of their 
(lucrative) livelihood. Repealing it would be an existential threat and 
they responded with political resources commensurate to that threat. 
On the other side of the battle was corporate America, particularly 
the high tech sector, wailing that lawsuits were chilling growth and 
destroying jobs. Neither side had the political clout to declare outright 
victory—the result was a stalemate. Congress tightened the screws on 
securities class actions, but left FOTM suits largely alone. With big 
donors on both sides, the FOTM presumption was simply too 
politically hot to handle and the status quo prevailed. Nothing has 
changed to alter that political calculus in the last twenty years. 
Perhaps the SEC, an independent agency, could rise above the 
political fray? Its opposition to reform during the legislative process 
leading up to the PSLRA is hardly promising, and the SEC’s 
subsequent positions are no more encouraging. The SEC consistently 
sides with the plaintiffs’ bar in its amicus role, as it did in Halliburton 
II. The SEC’s support for the plaintiffs’ bar in part reflects its own 
 
 63. On Powell’s influence, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the 
Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003). 
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institutional interests because the agency favors broad interpretations 
of its governing statutes.64 The SEC’s commitment to the plaintiffs’ bar 
goes beyond that interest, however, as it sides with the plaintiffs’ bar 
even on issues that relate purely to the terms of the implied Rule 10b-
5 cause of action, like the price impact issue in Halliburton II. Those 
issues have no effect on the SEC’s enforcement agenda; the SEC does 
not have to prove reliance in its enforcement cases.65 The SEC’s long-
standing commitment to the plaintiffs’ bar can only be ascribed to 
ideology, as the agency staff views its investor protection role broadly. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are viewed (perhaps simplistically) as allies in that 
fight. The SEC has the authority to reform Rule 10b-5 class actions,66 
but given the agency’s track record, it is unrealistic to expect reform 
to come from that quarter. 
Who’s left? Perhaps shareholders will take matters into their own 
hands. Shareholders have the right incentives for evaluating reforms 
because they are forced to internalize both the benefits and costs of 
securities class actions. Shareholders benefit from securities class 
actions if those suits generate deterrence. Deterrence promotes 
accurate share prices and thereby reduces the cost of participation in 
the securities markets. These benefits flow to corporations as well 
because they translate into a lower cost of capital. Shareholders (at 
least some of them) are also the beneficiaries of the compensation 
paid out in securities class actions, modest though it may be. On the 
other side of the equation, shareholders (all of them this time) also 
ultimately bear the costs of securities fraud class actions, including the 
payment of attorneys’ fees on both sides of the litigation, the cost of 
experts (ramped up by Halliburton II), and the distraction costs to 
executives arising from defending the lawsuit. Directors’s and 
officers’s insurance will cover most of the direct costs, but the premia 
for that insurance are ultimately paid by the shareholders. Less 
tangible, but perhaps larger, are costs firms incur to avoid being sued:  
more money spent on lawyers’ fees for flyspecking disclosure 
documents, higher auditors’ fees, and less forthcoming disclosure. 
 
 64. See, e.g, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197–99 (1976) (rejecting the SEC 
argument—advanced as amicus in a private suit—for a negligence standard in Rule 10b-5 
actions). 
 65.  Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The SEC is not required to 
prove reliance or injury in enforcement actions.”); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549–51 
(3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the government need not prove reliance in criminal cases). 
 66.  Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994). 
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These costs are not covered by insurance. How does the balance tip 
between the benefits of deterrence and its costs? Perhaps 
shareholders should be allowed to weigh for themselves. 
The most sensible option would be to allow shareholders to 
change the damage measure in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class 
actions involving the company, its officers, and directors.67 Instead of 
compensation, which is theoretically dubious and rarely achieved in 
practice, shareholders might want to focus on deterrence. Specifically, 
shareholders could adopt an unjust enrichment model through a 
partial waiver of the FOTM presumption of reliance in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation. The waiver would stipulate to 
a disgorgement measure of damages, requiring violators to give up the 
benefits of the fraud, if the FOTM presumption were invoked in a 
securities class action. This partial waiver would not limit shareholder-
plaintiffs who could plead actual reliance on a misstatement; they 
could still seek the standard out-of-pocket measure of damages in 
these cases (i.e., compensation would be available to them). Thus, in a 
FOTM suit, the company itself would only be liable when making an 
offering or repurchasing shares. It would only be liable for out-of-
pocket compensation to plaintiffs who actually relied to their 
detriment. Deterrence, however, would still be served. Executives who 
violated Rule 10b-5 would be liable to repay their compensation tied 
to the stock price (bonuses, stock, and options) during the time that 
the price was fraudulently manipulated; here the FOTM presumption 
could be invoked. 
Obviously the damages paid under a disgorgement measure are 
unlikely to afford full compensation, but compensation is not the 
answer to securities fraud in the secondary market. Investors protect 
themselves through diversification; settlements currently only 
compensate for a trivial percentage of investor losses. The goal of 
securities fraud class actions should be that of unjust enrichment: 
deterrence. The purpose of the FOTM version of the Rule 10b-5 cause 
of action should be to deprive wrongdoers of the benefits they 
obtained by violating Rule 10b-5. Disgorgement is closely tailored to 
that goal. 
 
 
 67.  I explicate this proposal in greater detail in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
217. 
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Can shareholders amend corporate charters to fix this badly 
broken system? The staff of the SEC takes the position that such 
waivers are illegal.68 Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act voids 
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive 
compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder.” Read broadly, § 29 would bar any provision affecting a 
right created by the Securities Exchange Act. And written broadly, an 
anti-reliance provision could arguably waive compliance with § 10(b) 
(although SEC and criminal enforcement would still be available). 
The Supreme Court has not addressed waiver of reliance clauses; it 
has only interpreted § 29 in connection with mandatory arbitration 
clauses. After initially concluding that arbitration provisions 
conflicted with the anti-waiver provisions in the securities law,69 the 
Court reversed course, concluding that forum selection clauses and 
arbitration provisions were enforceable because they did not affect 
any “substantive obligations” imposed by the Securities Exchange 
Act.70 
The SEC, however, takes the position that the FOTM 
presumption is a substantive obligation of the Securities Exchange 
Act, despite the fact that it was created by the Supreme Court, not 
Congress. Moreover, the Supreme Court has described the FOTM 
presumption as “a substantive doctrine of federal securities-fraud 
law” in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds 
and in Halliburton II, although the Court has not explained why.71 So 
a waiver of the FOTM presumption—the single reform that would 
most closely tie securities fraud class actions to deterrence—may be a 
non-starter under current law. 
A more blunderbuss response to the problem of securities fraud 
class actions would be for shareholders to amend the corporate 
charter to require that such disputes be settled in arbitration, without 
the ability to consolidate individual cases into a class action.72 A 
 
 68.  Alaska Air Grp. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 916161 (Mar. 11, 2011). 
 69.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 70.  Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987); see also Rodriguez, 490 
U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko).  
 71.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & 
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013)). 
 72.  Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual 
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187 (2013); see also Varian 
Afshar, Note, A Blended Approach to Reducing the Costs of Shareholder Litigation, 113 MICH. 
L. REV. 315 (2014). 
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consistent series of decisions from the Supreme Court interpreting 
the Federal Arbitration Act strongly supports the enforceability of 
such a provision.73 The SEC’s staff of course disagrees, taking the 
position that arbitration clauses violate § 29 of the Securities 
Exchange Act, notwithstanding the contrary Supreme Court 
precedent.74 
Would investors favor such clauses? An arbitration clause is 
something of a nuclear option, eliminating both the deterrent value of 
securities class actions and the waste they engender. Investors 
presumably all favor deterrence, but their interests may diverge on 
the availability of compensation, which would be substantially 
curtailed under an arbitration regime. The relatively low rate of 
participation by retail shareholders in securities class action 
settlements suggests that they do not value compensation all that 
highly.75 Shareholders who are holders, trading infrequently, are likely 
to favor an arbitration regime because they are typically on the 
paying end of litigation and settlement in class actions. Investors who 
index, whether individual or institutional, are likely to see things the 
same way as holders. Indexers have protected themselves against the 
firm-specific risk of fraud through diversification; they are unlikely to 
favor paying large premiums to lawyers for additional insurance that 
they do not need. The votes of institutional investors who actively 
pick stocks are harder to handicap. On the one hand, they are more 
likely to have been trading during a fraud period, so they are more 
likely to be members of a FOTM class. On the other, the proposed 
regime would still allow such investors to pursue arbitration, which 
might be feasible if they made a large (losing) bet on a stock. 
Of course, we will get prompt feedback if investors make the 
wrong call in voting to adopt an arbitration clause. If eliminating 
FOTM class actions undermines deterrence, we would expect to see a 
stock price drop for a firm that requires arbitration of securities 
disputes. That will be powerful evidence for opponents of arbitration. 
If on the other hand, the stock price response is positive, shareholders 
 
 73.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 74.  See Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause From I.P.O. Plans N.Y. TIMES, 
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-
p-o-plans/. 
 75.  James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional 
Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions, 80 WASH U. L.Q. 855 (2002); A.C. 
Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002). 
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are likely to follow that pioneering firm’s lead in requiring arbitration. 
We should at least encourage shareholders to experiment so that we 
can get an answer to the question of whether shareholders—those 
whom the current system is supposed to benefit—value it as much as 
the lawyers and the SEC do. 
Even more draconian than arbitration would be a fee-shifting rule. 
Corporations might amend their by-laws to adopt a “loser pays” 
regime for shareholders bringing suit against the corporation, its 
officers, and directors.76 A few of these provisions have already 
popped up, and there is reason to believe that the Delaware courts, at 
least, will uphold them.77 For those who think that shareholder 
litigation has some role to play in keeping officers and directors 
accountable, this development is likely to be viewed with alarm.78 
Notably, so far the provisions have been asymmetrical: the 
shareholder pays if he loses, but the corporation is not obliged to pay 
if it loses.79 This feature is likely to make such provisions difficult to 
enforce if challenged, although the in terrorem effect of them may 
deter shareholder litigation in the short run. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has struggled for a generation with the wrong 
turn it took in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The fraud-on-the-market regime 
established in Basic shifts money from one shareholder pocket to 
another shareholder pocket at enormous expense. In Halliburton II, 
the Court extinguished any hope that it would fix its prior error. The 
Court’s institutional commitment to stare decisis—perhaps coupled 
with an awareness of its own limitations with the subject matter—
kept it from making any meaningful change. Congress and the SEC 
have both had the opportunity to fix the problem created by Basic, 
but those institutions are either paralyzed by gridlock (Congress) or 
ideologically committed to the status quo (the SEC). 
 
 
 76.  Alison Frankel, Sneaky new trend in IPOs: Make shareholders pay if they sue and lose, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2014) http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/10/09/sneaky-new-trend-in-
ipos-make-shareholders-pay-if-they-sue-and-lose/. 
 77.  ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 78.  See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders, Disarmed by a Delaware Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/business/shareholders-disarmed-by-
a-delaware-court.html. 
 79.  Nithya Narayanan, America’s Tweak To The Loser Pays Rule: A Board-Insulating 
Mechanism?, 18 NYSBA N.Y. BUS. L.J. (Winter 2014). 
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Shareholders bear the costs of the FOTM regime, and 
shareholders have the power to end those costs by adopting 
arbitration or fee-shifting provisions. That “nuclear option” comes at a 
cost, however, as it eliminates entirely the deterrent value of securities 
class actions. Will shareholders clean up the mess that the Supreme 
Court has created with securities class actions? Stay tuned. 
 
